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Measures of Corporate Performance: Insights from Listed Firms of 
Pakistan 
 
Abstract 
This paper is a first attempt to look into the issue of the effect of leverage and adjustment 
costs on various measures of corporate performance for 374 non-financial firms listed on 
Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. The Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data 
estimation technique (a variant of GMM) is used to capture the role of adjustment costs 
and the dynamic behavior of corporate performance. A panel data set spanning 1988 to 
2008 is used for the purpose. The results, thus obtained, are essentially mixed. The 
coefficients of the adjustment variable (lagged corporate performance) are positive for 
ROCE (Return on capital employed) and EPS (Earnings per Share) but ironically 
negative for ROE (Return on Equity). 
Similarly the effect of leverage on ROCE is negative but insignificant and positive 
significant when EPS is used as a measure of corporate performance. Whereas the 
relationship between leverage and ROE (another measure used in the paper for 
corporate performance) is negative and significant which implies that high leverage 
force the managers to perform optimally due to higher interest burden and agency cost. 
The positive effect of the size of firm on performance is confirmed for all the three 
measures of corporate performance. Furthermore, the positive and statistically 
significant impact of short term liabilities implies that high short term liabilities exert 
pressure on corporate managers to perform efficiently in the competitive market. 
Keywords: Corporate Performance, leverage, adjustment costs, panel data, Pakistan 
JEL Codes: G34, G32, C23 
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1. Introduction 
In corporate finance literature one of the much debated issues is the relationship between 
leverage and corporate performance. This debate started with the celebrated irrelevance 
theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1958) which brought about a revolution in corporate 
finance. According to this theorem in a perfect capital market, where there are no 
transaction costs and where perfect rationality and certainty prevails, the capital structure 
choice is of no relevance. However after a series of modifications made by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), it was revealed that the level of debt in a firm financing does have 
impact on a firm’s behavior and its performance. 
On the other side, as leverage increases it increase the agency costs because the interests 
of shareholders and debt holders are different resulting in an increase in the total cost of 
the company. Therefore leverage may be negatively correlated with performance (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; and Mayers, 1977). The extant literature varies over the conclusion 
if leverage is positively or negatively related to corporate performance. The reasons 
behind these diverging views can be many; different performance measures and/or 
different estimation techniques. The contribution of the present paper is twofold; first 
three different performance measures are used in order to check the divergence in the 
results due to different measures, second Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is 
used to capture the dynamics of the model. The use of GMM has also enabled to unfold 
the role of adjustment costs in the determination of corporate performance.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief overview of extant 
literature, section 3 contains model specification and data description, section 4 has the 
discussion of results while section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
There are very limited studies in the extant literature to have had analyzed the 
relationship between leverage and corporate performance. To the author knowledge there 
is no such study conducted for Pakistan to date. However studies carried out for other 
countries generally differ in choosing a proxy for corporate performance. Broadly 
categorizing, the literature can be divided into two different strands on the basis of 
measures used for performance. The first strand uses total factor productivity (Pushner 
1995; Nickell et al. 1997; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). The second strand of literature 
uses basic accounting measures of performance (Majumdar and chibber 1999; Kinsmen 
and Newman, 1999). All of these studies have different results due to either the measure 
used for performance or due to the econometric technique employed. Weill (2008) asserts 
that the link between performance and leverage differs across different countries. He, 
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moreover, maintains that it’s the legal system of the country that primarily determines 
corporate performance. 
3. Data description and Model Specification 
The data set consists of the financial accounts of the publically listed firms in Pakistan. A 
total of 374 firms which are listed on Karachi Stock Exchange for the period spanning 
1988 to 2008 are considered.  The data is collected from “Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint 
Stock Companies”, listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, State Bank of Pakistan and 
annual reports of Karachi Stock Exchange. 
3.1. Industries classification 
 
Table 1: Classification of industries 
S # Industry No. of 
Firms 
As a Percentage 
of Total 
1 Textile 166 44.38 
2 Chemicals 26 6.95 
3 Engineering 36 9.63 
4 Sugar & Allied Industries 35 9.36 
5 Paper & Board 10 2.67 
6 Cement 16 4.28 
7 Fuel & Energy 18 4.81 
8 Transport & Communication 5 1.34 
9 Tobacco 3 0.80 
10 Jute 6 1.60 
11 Vanaspati & Allied Industries 7 1.87 
12 Miscellaneous 46 12.30 
  Total 374 100.00 
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Table 1 presents a summary of the dependent and explanatory variables and their 
measurement.  
Table 2: Variables description and measurement 
S.No Acronym Dependent Variable Measurement 
1 ROCE Return on Capital 
Employed 
Ratio of net operating profit to 
the net operating assets 
2 EPS Earnings per share Ratio of net income to the 
number of shares outstanding 
3 ROE Return on Equity Ratio of net income to the 
number of shareholder’s equity 
S.No.  Explanatory Variables Measurement 
1 LEVR Leverage of the firm  Ratio of total debt to total assets 
2 TANG Tangibility of Assets Ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets 
3 SIZE Size of the firm Natural log of total assets 
4 STLR Short term liabilities ratio Ratio of short term liabilities to 
total liabilities 
 
3.2. Model Specification  
Dynamic panel data usually suffers from endogeneity, omitted variables bias, and 
heteroscedasticity. In dynamic models, the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach does 
not account formally for potential simultaneity bias, nor does it control explicitly for Firm 
fixed effects or the routine use of lagged dependent variables in regressions which results 
in the inconsistency and upward biasness of the estimators due to serial correlation 
between the autoregressive ( , 1i tY  ) parameters and error terms ( it ). This inconsistency 
would persist even when N and T grows larger. (Pesaran and Smith 1995) have suggested 
that serial correlation can be removed by first differencing; they express their reservations 
as to the generalization of this approach. In such a situation, a dynamic panel data model 
with instrumental variables (IV) should provide accurate and consistent results. 
Accordingly Generalized Method of Moments will be employed in this paper. The 
general specification of the model can be written as: 
, ,i t i tCP X  
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Where 
,i tCP = Corporate performance of the ith firm in time t 
,i tX = Vector of explanatory variables 
To be more specific the following models are specified for different measures of 
corporate performance: 
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1
5 , 6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 1
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
ROCE ROCE LEVR LEVR TANG TANG
SIZE SIZE STLR STLR
     
    
  
 
     
     
 
Where 
,i tROCE = Return on Capital Employed by ith firm in current year 
, 1i tROCE  = Return on Capital Employed by ith firm in the Previous Year 
,i tLEVR = Leverage of the ith firm in current year 
, 1i tLEVR  = Leverage of the ith in the previous year 
,i tTANG = Tangibility of Assets of the ith firm in current year 
, 1i tTANG  = Lagged tangibility of Assets of the ith firm 
,i tSIZE = Size of the ith firm in current year 
, 1i tSIZE  = Size of the ith firm in the previous year 
,i tSTLR = Ratio of short term liabilities to total liabilities of the ith firm in current year 
, 1i tSTLR  = Ratio of short term liabilities to total liabilities of the ith firm in the previous 
year 
 = Error term in the model 
, 0 , 1 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1
5 , 6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 2
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
EPS EPS LEVR LEVR TANG TANG
SIZE SIZE STLR STLR
     
    
  
 
     
     
 
Where 
7 
 
,i tEPS = Earnings per share of the ith firm in the current year 
, 1i tEPS  = Earnings per share of the ith firm in the previous year 
And rest of the variables is the same as those in model 1 
, , 1 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 1
5 , 6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 3
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
ROE oROE LEVR LEVR TANG TANG
SIZE SIZE STLR STLR
     
    
  
 
     
     
 
 Where 
,i tROE = Return on Equity of the ith firm in current year 
, 1i tROE  = Return on Equity of the ith firm in previous year 
And rest of the variables is the same as in model 1 and 2 
4. Discussion of Results 
Table 3 Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation results 
Variable ROCE EPS ROE 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
∆ROCE .1099605 0.000 .720277 0.000 -.0109482 0.000 
∆LEVRt-1 .0000345 0.000 .0066048 0.000 -.0000551 0.000 
∆LEVR -.000189 0.153 .0021585 0.000 -.0920797 0.000 
∆TANGt-1 -.0004122 0.000 -.0034612 0.000 -.0003635 0.000 
∆TANG .0013073 0.000 .0058389 0.000 -.0002843 0.000 
∆SIZEt-1 -.7975204 0.000 -12.59335 0.000 -.9760587 0.000 
∆SIZE .7865054 0.000 7.717186 0.000 1.269869 0.000 
∆STLRt-1 .0355179 0.000 -16.3255 0.000 1.119906 0.000 
∆STLR .0230453 0.007 15.46664 0.000 .9380895 0.000 
Constant -.0012807 0.000 .1937677 0.000 -.0504003 0.000 
 Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions: 
Chi
2
(189) = 27.43 
Prob > Chi
2
 = 0.2130 
Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions: 
Chi
2
(189) = 27.51 
Prob > Chi
2 
= 0.1621 
Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions: 
Chi
2
(189) = 28.81 
Prob > Chi
2 
= 0.0983 
Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance 
in residuals of order 1 is 
0: 
H0: No Autocorrelation  
z= -1.05  
Prob > z = .2930 
Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance 
in residuals of order 1 is 
0: 
H0: No Autocorrelation  
z= -3.95 
Prob > z = 0.0001 
Arellano-Bond test that 
average autocovariance 
in residuals of order 1 is 
0: 
H0: No Autocorrelation  
z= -1.85 
Prob > z = .0642 
The estimates are obtained using Stata version 9.2 
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The results in table 3 reveal the following findings: 
The coefficients of the adjustment variable (lagged corporate performance) are positive 
for ROCE and EPS but ironically negative for ROE. The adjustment speed for ROCE is 
89 percent (1-.1099605), 27.97 percent for EPS and 101.095 percent for ROE. These 
findings suggest that the performance of all these firms are sub-optimal thus desiring to 
reach to the optimal level at a quite high speed. 
The relationship of leverage with corporate performance is negative but insignificant in 
case of ROCE as a measure of performance, whereas it is positive and significant when 
EPS is used as a measure of performance. The positive relationship of EPS and 
performance indicates that leverage doesn’t hinder corporate performance but 
simultaneously this result can be attributed to the presence of serial correlation present in 
the model while regressing CP on EPS as can be seen from table 2. Where the Arellano-
Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 rejects the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The coefficient of leverage in case of ROE as 
performance measure is negative and significant. Thus the results here give mix effects of 
leverage on different measures of corporate performance. 
Tangibility, similarly, gives mixed results. The coefficients of TANG are positive and 
significant when ROCE and EPS are used as performance measures but it is negative and 
significant when ROE is used as a measure of performance. The positive impact of 
tangibility on corporate performance suggests that fixed assets are efficiently used as 
collateral for borrowing in the debt market.  
Size, for all the three measures of corporate performance, has positive and significant 
coefficients. This can be attributed to the economies of scale as larger firms have better 
economies to scale. Secondly larger firms can attract the best managers available in the 
market through lucrative incentives and big salaries. In the same vain larger firms have 
access to cheaper finance relative to smaller firms. 
Similarly, short term liabilities have positive and significant effect on all the three 
measures of corporate performance.  
5. Conclusion and Policy recommendations 
This paper attempted to look into the issue of the relationship between leverage and 
various measures of corporate performance for 374 non-financial firms listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange of Pakistan. The Arellano and Bond dynamic panel data estimation 
technique was used to capture the role of adjustment costs and the dynamic behavior of 
corporate performance. The results, thus obtained, were essentially mixed. The 
coefficients of the adjustment variable (lagged corporate performance) were positive for 
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ROCE (Return on capital employed) and EPS (Earnings per Share) but ironically 
negative for ROE (Return on Equity). 
Similarly the effect of leverage on ROCE was negative but insignificant and positive 
significant when EPS was used as a measure of corporate performance. Whereas the 
relationship between leverage and ROE (another measure used in the paper for corporate 
performance) was negative and significant which implies that high leverage force the 
managers to perform optimally due to higher interest burden and agency cost (Jitendra 
Mahakud and A K Misra, 2009). Currently in Pakistan interest rate is rising steadily thus 
lowering the confidence of investors to invest in high levered firms. Therefore it is 
suggested that investors should invest in low levered firms. The positive effect of the size 
of firm on performance is confirmed for all the three measures of corporate performance. 
The positive and statistically significant impact of short term liabilities implies that high 
short term liabilities exert pressure on corporate managers to perform efficiently in the 
competitive market otherwise they would be facing the burden of debt thus decreasing 
the value of firm. This in turn will make the investors to switch over to other firms for 
better investment opportunities.   
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